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ABANDONMENT v ADOPTION:
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND
THE NEED FOR DISTINCT LEGAL INQUIRIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The institution of the family enjoys a unique status in American
culture. The family unit, bonded together through love and common
interests, provides the most effective means for educating children to
become capable, knowledgeable adults. The societal benefits that ac-
crue through the family structure are the underlying basis for the de-
velopment of the law in this area. Family law has developed to
promote family integrity and to discourage government intervention in
familial affairs. To achieve these ends, certain fundamental parental
rights have been developed which give parents broad control over their
child's development.
Parental rights are, however, accompanied by parental responsi-
bilities. When a parent disregards these responsibilities, the state may
seek to intervene, both on its own behalf and on behalf of the affected
child. When a parent's disregard has reached a level so extreme that
no viable alternative remains, the state may seek the most drastic of all
remedies, the complete severance of the parent-child relationship
through termination of parental rights.
Alaska provides two statutory mechanisms for the involuntary
termination of parental rights: "child in need of aid" proceedings1 and
adoption proceedings.2 Currently, both proceedings are based on ob-
jective standards of proof, with the former focusing on prior parental
conduct as it evinces abandonment of the child, and the latter focusing
on whether a parent's failure to communicate with a child lacks "justi-
fiable" cause.
While both proceedings produce the same result, the involuntary
termination of parental rights, differences in both the interests affected
and in the likelihood of a wrongful terminati5n necessitate distinct in-
quiries. Specifically, a potential for abuse of the current objective stan-
dard in the adoption context is not present in "child in need of aid"
proceedings. To eliminate the possibility that a natural parent may
unjustly lose a child through non-consensual adoption, Alaska should
Copyright © 1990 by Alaska Law Review
1. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010 (Supp. 1989); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1984).
2. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.040-050, 25.23.180 (Supp. 1989).
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replace the objective standard in its adoption inquiry with a subjective
standard, while maintaining the current practice of separately consid-
ering whether an adoption would be in the best interests of the child.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS
The psychological bonds cultivated within the family are the pri-
mary means through which children learn and develop into mature,
capable adults. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural."' 3
To safeguard the family structure, federal and state law have de-
veloped certain parental rights which give parents priority in control-
ling their child's development. The United States Supreme Court has
described the right to raise one's children as "essential, ' 4 a "basic civil
right of man"5 and a right "far more precious . . . than property
rights."' 6 These characterizations have recently led the Court to con-
clude that "a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children' is an important inter-
est that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful coun-
tervailing interest, protection.' "7 The parent-child relationship is thus
"constitutionally protected,"'8 and the cumulative result of the Court's
decisions is that "[t]he primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring Ameri-
can tradition." 9
The Alaska courts have similarly acknowledged the deference to
be accorded the family, and the related right of parents to raise their
children. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized parents' "funda-
mental natural right . . . to nurture and direct the destiny of their
3. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
4. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
5. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
6. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
7. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.").
8. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
9. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
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children," 10 and has stated that "[ilt would be repugnant to the natu-
ral law to deprive a parent of the right to rear his children, except for
the most grave reasons."' 1l
The right of parents to raise their children is not absolute, how-
ever.' 2 With parental rights come parental responsibilities, and when
a parent fails to fulfill these responsibilities, the rights and interests of
both the child and the state must be considered. In the 1973 case,
D.M. v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed the rights and in-
terests of the child: "We acknowledge that parental rights are of seri-
ous and substantial import. We note, however, that in recent years the
courts have become increasingly aware of the rights of children." 13 In
1976, the court specified the competing interests of parent and child:
"The parents' constitutional right to the care and custody of their chil-
dren must be balanced against the rights of their children to an ade-
quate home and education."' 4
A parent's disregard of parental responsibilities also gives rise to
certain rights of the state. Just as the parent has an interest in the
growth and development of a child, so too does the state. "The State
... has an independent interest in the well-being of the youth....
[T]he State has an interest 'to protect the welfare of the children,' and
to see that they are 'safeguarded from abuses' which might prevent
their 'growth into free and independent well-developed men and citi-
zens.' ,,15 If the state perceives its interest to be in jeopardy, it may
intervene to ensure the child's continued development.
The state's right to disregard traditional deference to family in-
tegrity, and to intervene in familial affairs, is rooted in the long-estab-
lished doctrine of parens patriae. 16 In Prince v. Massachusetts,17 the
United States Supreme Court applied theparenspatriae doctrine when
10. Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1055 (1975) (Dimond, J., concurring).
11. Id. See also In re L.A.M., 547 P.2d 827, 832-33 n.13 (Alaska 1976) ("A care-
ful review of the literature, including case law, treatise and law review, indicates that
the following have been listed as 'parental rights' protected to varying degrees by the
Constitution: (1) Physical possession of the child which, in the case of a custodial
parent includes the day-to-day care and companionship of the child. . .
12. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
13. D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted).
14. In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1201 (Alaska 1976).
15. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968) (quoting Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
16. Parenspatriae (literally, "parent of the country") originated from the English
common law wherein the King was empowered to act as guardian for, inter alia, in-
fants. The doctrine generally refers to the role of the state as guardian of the legally
disabled. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). For history and analysis
of the parens patriae doctrine, see Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the
Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971).
17. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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it held that a guardian could not permit a minor under her care to
distribute pamphlets in violation of child labor laws, even though the
guardian believed such distribution was a religious duty. " The Court
concluded that although the guardian was free to make a martyr of
herself, she did not have the right to make a martyr of her minor
child.19
One of the most severe applications of the parens patriae doctrine
involves the involuntary termination of parental rights. Involuntary
termination represents a drastic alternative. Not only does it generally
terminate a parent's child custody rights, but it also severs a parent's
visitation and communication rights as well.2 0 In terminating parental
rights, a court makes a value judgment that, when irreconcilable, fam-
ily autonomy and parental freedom should give way to the state's in-
terest in protecting its children.
Consonant with its desire to preserve family integrity, the United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged the harshness of terminating
parental rights: "When the State initiates a parental rights termina-
tion proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental lib-
erty interest, but to end it. 'If the State prevails, it will have worked a
unique kind of deprivation .... , ",21 In an attempt to balance the com-
peting interests of the natural parents and the state at parental rights
termination proceedings, the United States Supreme Court held in
Santosky v. Kramer that due process requires that the state prove its
allegations by "clear and convincing" evidence.22
Alaska 'had imposed the same burden of proof on the state even
before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santosky. In
1979, the Alaska Supreme Court held that "clear and convincing" was
the proper evidentiary standard for termination and non-consensual
adoption proceedings. 23 Moreover, in reaching its decision in
Santosky, the Supreme Court cited Alaska's termination statute,24
18. Id. at 170.
19. Id.
20. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982).
21. Id. at 759 (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27
(1981)). Indeed, the Washington Court of Appeals has referred to termination as an
infringement on rights "more precious to many people than the right to life itself." In
re Gibson, 4 Wash. App. 372, 379, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (Ct. App. 1971). In Davis v.
Page, 618 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd in part, vacated and rev'd in part on
reh'g, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the court in a similar vein stated that "it
is not unlikely that many parents would choose to serve a prison sentence rather than
to lose the companionship and custody of their children."
22. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
23. In re C.L.T., 597 P.2d 518, 525-26 (Alaska 1979).
24. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1980).
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along with the termination statutes of fourteen other states that con-
tained the "clear and convincing" standard.25 Since Santosky, both
the Alaska Supreme Court26 and the Alaska Legislature27 have reaf-
firmed the "clear and convincing" standard.
III. MECHANISMS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Drastic consequences accompany the termination of parental
rights. Accordingly, Alaska has clearly limited the means by which
parental rights may be terminated. Initially, termination of parental
rights may not be based solely on public policy grounds. "Involuntary
termination of parental rights may not be accomplished absent some
statutorily mandated procedure. 28
Alaska has two statutory mechanisms for the involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights: "child in need of aid" proceedings and adop-
tion proceedings. Sections IV and V of this note, respectively, will
analyze the issues involved in each of these proceedings.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS THROUGH "CHILD IN
NEED OF AID" PROCEEDINGS
A. The Statutory Framework
The statutory framework for terminating parental rights for the
parents of "children in need of aid" provides that the court may find a
child to be a "child in need of aid" as a result of the following:
(A) the child being habitually absent from home or refusing to
accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian, or
relative caring or willing to provide care, including physical aban-
donment by
(i) both parents
(ii) the surviving parent, or
(iii) one parent if the other parent's rights and responsibil-
ities have been terminated under [Alaska Stat. § ]
25.23.180(c) or [Alaska Stat. § ] 47.10.080 or voluntarily
relinquished. 29
25. 455 U.S. at 749 n.3.
26. In re J.R.B., 715 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Alaska 1986); K.T.E. v. State, 689 P.2d
472, 476 (Alaska 1984).
27. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984). See infra text accompanying note
30.
28. S.J. v. L.T., 727 P.2d 789, 795 (Alaska 1986) (footnote omitted) (trial court's
termination of parental rights solely on public policy grounds was held to be reversible
error).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 1989).
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If the court finds the child to be a "child in need of aid," the court
shall:
(3) by order, upon a showing in the adjudication by clear and con-
vincing evidence that there is a child in need of aid under [Alaska
Stat. § ]47.10.010(a)(2) as a result of parental conduct and upon a
showing in the disposition by clear and convincing evidence that the
parental conduct is likely to continue to exist if there is no termina-
tion of parental rights, terminate parental rights and responsibilities
of one or both parents and commit the child to the department or to
a legally appointed guardian of the person of the child .... 30
B. Abandonment: The Objective Standard and the Role of the
Child's "Best Interests"
Physical abandonment by one or both parents is the most com-
mon ground for finding a child to be a "child in need of aid." In
Alaska, "[t]he test for abandonment has two prongs: (1) has the par-
ent's conduct evidenced a disregard for his or her parental obligations,
and (2) has that disregard led to the destruction of the parent-child
relationship. '31
The first prong of the physical abandonment inquiry focuses on
parental conduct. Alaska "focuses on the objective conduct of the
parents in discharging their parental responsibility. Thus, abandon-
ment is not determined by the parent's subjective intent ... .
Alaska's objective standard imposes on the parent "the duty to make
reasonable efforts to locate and communicate with his or her child.
Token efforts by a parent to communicate with his or her child are
insufficient to satisfy this parental duty."'33
In justifying its repudiation of a subjective test for physical aban-
donment, the Alaska Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he subjective
intent standard often focuses too much attention on the parent's wish-
ful thoughts and hopes for the child and too little on the more impor-
tant element of how well the parents have discharged their parental
responsibility."' 34 Thus, a finding of non-abandonment based solely on
subjective intent would be reversible error.35
The Alaska Supreme Court's justification for using an objective
standard of abandonment appears to be sound. In abandonment pro-
ceedings, both litigants, the parent and the state, have an interest in
salvaging the parent-child relationship if at all possible. The parent's
30. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(c)(3) (1984).
31. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439 (Alaska 1983).
32. E.J.S. v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 754 P.2d 749, 751 (Alaska
1988).
33. Id.
34. In re D.M., 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973).
35. In re V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 793 (Alaska 1974).
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interest is manifested by the challenge to the abandonment charge it-
self. The state's interest stems from the fact that if the parent-child
relationship cannot be salvaged, the child will become a ward of the
state. The focus on parental conduct allows a court to consider dis-
cernible facts, not amorphous intentions. Through a parent's prior
conduct, a court may assess the potential for reconstructing a dam-
aged parent-child relationship. Most often, parents control their own
actions, and the parent is solely to blame if those actions amount to a
breach of parental duties and responsibilities.
There are instances, however, where parents cannot control their
relations with the child because the child's whereabouts are unknown.
Holding parents to the objective standard in these instances may ter-
minate the rights of parents who desired communication with the
child, but who honestly believed such communication was impossible.
All cases in this area are necessarily fact specific, and in many cases
the relevant facts are not beyond dispute. In E.J.S. v. Department of
Health and Social Services, 36 for example, the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's finding that a father had physically aban-
doned his daughter. The abandonment was sufficient to justify termi-
nation of his parental rights. The father claimed that he had tried to
find his daughter by, for example, contacting his daughter's friends,
maternal grandparents and maternal great-grandparents. These
claims had been disputed at trial. 37 The court found that the father's
efforts did not constitute "reasonable efforts to locate and communi-
cate with his daughter. '38
Alaska has mitigated the potential harshness of the objective
abandonment standard by also considering the "best interests" of the
child. By considering the best interests of the child, a court may avoid
injustice in situations where a reasonableness inquiry might result in
the wrongful termination of parental rights. As noted, cases in this
area are fact specific, and the crucial facts are often disputed. In close
cases, the courts can use the "best interests" factor to promote the goal
of family preservation. Parents whose conduct fails to satisfy the ob-
jective abandonment standard may nonetheless have a valid reason for
their conduct, such as a perceived inability to communicate with the
child. In addition, the parent may have shown the kind of love and
affection which would make salvaging the family relationship in the
child's best interests.
As for the particular role of the child's best interests in the aban-
donment analysis, Alaska statutory law provides that "in making its
dispositional order under [Alaska Statutes section] 47.10.080(c) the
36. 745 P.2d 749, 751 (Alaska 1988).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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court shall consider the best interests of the child... .,39 The Alaska
courts have interpreted this statute narrowly, holding that "while the
best interests of the child become relevant at some point, there must
first be a showing of parental conduct sufficient to justify termina-
tion." 40 Thus, consideration of the child's best interests in a termina-
tion proceeding is proper only after the first prong of the abandonment
inquiry has been satisfied.41
C. Procedure Following the Abandonment Determination
If both prongs of the abandonment inquiry are not satisfied, the
child must be returned to the custody of his or her natural parents,
guardian or custodian; and the termination proceedings must be dis-
missed.42 If, however, the child is found to have been physically aban-
doned so as to qualify as a "child in need of aid," an additional finding
is required before parental rights may be terminated. As noted,
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080(c)(3) requires the state to show, by
"clear and convincing" evidence, both that the child is in need of aid
as a result of parental conduct and that said parental conduct is "likely
to continue" absent a termination of parental rights.43 The "likely to
continue" inquiry must be conducted independently of the abandon-
ment inquiry; and a trial court's failure to find that the parent's con-
duct would likely continue absent termination of rights is reversible
error.44
39. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.082 (1984).
40. Nada A. v. State, 660 P.2d 436, 439-40 (Alaska 1983). See also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) ("If a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's best interests, I should have little doubt that the
State would have intruded impermissibly on 'the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter.' ") (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); In re V.M.C., 528 P.2d 788, 793 (Alaska
1974) ("though the best interests of the child are a valid consideration in deciding the
question of abandonment, they cannot be the sole determinant. .. ").
41. See In re B.J., 530 P.2d 747, 749 (Alaska 1975) (stating the two prongs of the
abandonment inquiry and noting that "[t]he best interests of the child are relevant to
the latter question. . . ." (quoting In re A.J.N., 525 P.2d 520, 523 (Alaska 1974)).
42. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(e) (1984).
43. Id. § 47.10.080 (c)(3). See supra text accompanying note 30.
44. E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Alaska 1981) (lower court's termination of
parental rights without a prior finding that the mother's alcohol problem was likely to
continue was grounds for reversal and remand).
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V. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS THROUGH NON-
CONSENSUAL ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
A. The Common Scenario and the Fundamental Right to Consent
Adoption-based termination proceedings most often involve di-
vorced parents. In the common scenario, the custodial parent remar-
ries and the stepparent seeks to adopt the child over the objections of
the natural, non-custodial parent. Alaska has recognized as a "paren-
tal right" protected by the United States Constitution "the right to
prevent an adoption of the child without the parents' consent. ' 45 In
addition, Alaska has recognized a "residual" parental right "that re-
main[s] after custody is placed in another... the right to consent to an
adoption and to withhold consent to prevent an adoption .... -46
Given the rights at stake in an adoption proceeding, "'where an abso-
lute severance of [the parent-child] relationship is sought, the consent
provisions are designed to protect the natural rights of a parent to the
custody, society, comfort, and services of the child.' 47 To protect
natural parents against unjust terminations of their rights, the Alaska
Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that the statutory
consent provisions must be strictly construed. 48
B. The Statutory Framework
Unless a statutory exception applies, consent to the relinquish-
ment of a child through adoption must be given by a party empowered
to give such consent.49 Such parties include, inter alia, natural par-
ents, guardians and custodians. 50 Alaska Statutes section 25.23.050
lists the exceptions to the general consent requirement. The statute
provides:
(a) Consent to adoption is not required of
(1) ... a parent who has abandoned a child for a period
of at least six months;
(2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the
parent for a period of at least one year has failed signifi-
cantly without justifiable cause, including but not limited
to indigency,
45. In re L.A.M., 547 P.2d 827, 832-33 n.13 (Alaska 1976).
46. Id.
47. Delgado v. Fawcett, 515 P.2d 710, 712 (Alaska 1973) (quoting In re Parks'
Petition, 267 Minn. 468, 473, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (1964)).
48. See, e.g., D.A. v. D.R.L., 727 P.2d 768, 770 (Alaska 1986); S.M.K. v. R.G.G.,
702 P.2d 620, 623 (Alaska 1985); R.N.T. v. J.R.G., 666 P.2d 1036, 1040 (Alaska
1983).
49. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040(a) (Supp. 1989) ("Unless consent is not re-
quired under [Alaska Stat. § ] 25.23.050, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted
only if written consent to a particular adoption has been executed. . .
50. See id.
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(A) to communicate meaningfully with the
child, or
(B) to provide for the care and support of the
child as required by law or judicial decree;
(5) a parent whose parental rights have been.terminated
by order of the court .... 51
Alaska Statutes section 25.23.180 states that parental rights, including
the right to withhold consent to an adoption, may be terminated at or
before an adoption proceeding.5 2 The effect of an adoption-based ter-
mination is identical to a termination based on abandonment. The
result in both cases is the complete severance of the parent-child
relationship.
C. Adoptions: The Objective Standard of "Without Justifiable
Cause"
Many adoption proceedings are decided under Alaska Statutes
section 25.23.050(a)(2), which states that the parental right to consent
to an adoption may be relinquished if a parent has failed "significantly
without justifiable cause" to "communicate meaningfully" with a child
or to pay court-ordered child support.5 3 Like the emphasis on paren-
tal conduct in the physical abandonment test,54 the Alaska Legislature
has chosen an objective standard on which to predicate the power to
consent. According to the Alaska Supreme Court, in the "justifiable
cause" inquiry, "[e]vidence of subjective intent may be admitted to
show what the 'cause' for the parent's course of action was, but
whether the cause was justifiable must turn on the court's determina-
tion of what grounds are objectively acceptable." '55
Determining what constitutes "justifiable cause" has been prob-
lematic. In In re K.M.M.5 6 a father's ex-wife began living with his
best friend, causing the father emotional trauma. The court held that
the father's written communication with his children only at Christ-
mas and on their birthdays was justified, and his consent was still re-
quired before his children could be adopted.57 In In re JJJ, 58 on the
other hand, the court stated that "failure to support or maintain con-
tact with a child should not be excused by the emotional antagonism
51. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.050(a)(l)-(2),(5) (Supp. 1989).
52. Id. § 25.23.180(a).
53. Id. § 25.23.050(a)(2).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 32-35.
55. D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834, 839 (Alaska 1981).
56. 611 P.2d 84 (Alaska 1980).
57. Id. at 88.
58. 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986).
[Vol. 7:247
TERMINATING PARENTAL RIGHTS
or awkwardness that may exist between former spouses."'59 The only
authority cited by the court in J.J.J. was the dissent in KMM, which
had stated that "'[in distinguishing between meaningful and non-
meaningful communication it is evident that the legislature intended
that the mere symbolic observation of birthdays and holidays would
not be enough to maintain the rights of parenthood.' "60 Finally, in
D.A. v. D.R.L., 61 the Alaska Supreme Court, citing KMM, affirmed a
trial court's finding that "the natural father's emotional difficulty in
visiting with the new family justified his failure to communicate with
the child."'62 The dissent claimed that the majority had erred in not
following the language of JJJ 63
The question of "justifiable cause" has also risen with respect to
the effect of imprisonment on a parent's failure to communicate with a
child. In R.N.T v. J.R.G., 64a divided court addressed this issue. Not-
ing that "parental conduct which causes loss of a parent's right to
consent to adoption must be wilful," 65 the court held that imprison-
ment is not necessarily wilful and therefore "[while] imprisonment
does not necessarily preclude a parent from communicating with his
children,... [w]here it does ... the failure to communicate is properly
considered non-wilful and thus justifiable cause."' 66 The dissent in
R.N. T criticized the majority's approach and argued that "imprison-
ment.., cannot be used ipso facto to hold as a matter of law that the
parent was justified in not communicating with or supporting his or
her children during the course of the imprisonment." 67 The dissent
believed that the proper analysis should consider whether the particu-
lar constraints imposed on the imprisoned parent justified the parent's
lack of communication. 6s
These two areas, emotional trauma and incarceration, illustrate
the difficulty the courts have had in applying an objective standard to
adoption proceedings. Indeed, certain concerns not present in aban-
donment proceedings make the objective standard more troublesome
in the adoption context. In abandonment proceedings, the parent is
opposed by the state. The state is not emotionally tied to the child and
hence is presumptively able to present a detached analysis capable of
objective evaluation. Moreover, parents are usually in control of their
59. Id. at 953.
60. Id. (quoting K.M.M., 611 P.2d at 88-89 (Matthews, J., dissenting)).
61. 727 P.2d 768 (Alaska 1986).
62. Id. at 770 (citing KM.M., 611 P.2d at 88).
63. Id. at 771 (Moore, J., dissenting).
64. 666 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1983).
65. Id. at 1038.
66. Id. at 1039.
67. Id. at 1040 (Compton, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1041 (Compton, J., dissenting).
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own conduct so that only the parents are to blame if their conduct
amounts to a breach of parental duties warranting a termination of
parental rights. Adoption proceedings, however, often pit parent
against parent. Consequently, both parties are emotionally and psy-
chologically tied to the child. The possibility that one parent may be
deceived into relinquishing the power of consent appears to be at a
premium in adoption proceedings.
The concern with one parent's manipulation of events manifested
itself in a recent adoption proceeding, In re B.S.L.69 In this case,
B.S.L.'s natural parents, Irma and Rick, were never married. When
B.S.L. was slightly more than one year old, and the family was living
in California, Rick left to find work in Alaska, intending to return for
Irma and the child. After Rick left, Irma and B.S.L. returned to Colo-
rado to live with Rick's mother, Rebecca. Upon receiving news that
her father was terminally ill, Irma left B.S.L. in Rebecca's care and
traveled to California to be with her father. Soon after Irma had left,
Rebecca reported to the Department of Social Services that B.S.L. had
been neglected and abused, allegations that Rebecca later admitted
were false. The Department of Social Services obtained legal custody
of B.S.L., and Rebecca obtained physical custody. Rick flew to Colo-
rado, picked up B.S.L., and returned to Anchorage. In speaking with
Irma upon her return to Colorado, Rick asked her to come to Alaska
but told her she would not be allowed to see B.S.L. Irma did not go to
Alaska. Irma consulted a legal aid attorney about obtaining custody
of B.S.L., but the attorney told her that he could not help her. Later
that year, Irma married and moved to Ohio. Following her marriage,
Irma spoke with various social workers and attorneys about obtaining
custody of B.S.L., but all to no avail. Irma also remained in contact
with Rick's grandmother and asked for photographs of B.S.L. Irma
did not send any cards or letters to B.S.L., because she "apparently
believed that any attempt by her to communicate with or locate
[B.S.L.] would be futile."' 70 Three years later, Rick's sister and her
husband, with whom B.S.L. had been living, petitioned for adoption.
The lower court found that Irma had failed without justifiable cause to
communicate with B.S.L., and granted the petition over Irma's
objection.71
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that Irma
had never actually tried to communicate directly with B.S.L.72 In
reaching its decision, however, the court appears to have abandoned
69. 779 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1989).
70. Id. at 1224.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1225.
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both policy and precedent. As noted by the dissent, the consent stat-
utes should be strictly construed in favor of the natural parent.73 The
dissent also argued that "'in circumstances where the child is too
young to read or communicate over the telephone, [the Alaska
Supreme Court has] relaxed the requirement of meaningful communi-
cation under the "without justifiable cause" language of [Alaska Stat-
utes section] 25.23.050(a)(2)(A).'-74
The court reached its decision despite acknowledging both that
Rebecca and Rick had purposefully worked to keep Irma from her
child, and that Irma believed any attempts to regain custody of B.S.L.
would be futile. With regard to the first of these acknowledgments,
the court reconciled its holding with Rick's and Rebecca's conduct by
claiming that "the issue in this case is not the conduct of Rick and his
mother, but the conduct of Irma. '' 75 Then, more generally, the court
added that "[t]he mere fact that a parent is at some point wrongfully
denied access to the child is not dispositive of the issue of justification.
The court must consider as well the efforts of the parent to overcome
the denial."'76
If the court is to consider a parent's efforts to overcome wrongful
denial of custody, however, it should also be willing to consider the
perceived likelihood of success of such efforts. Irma had contacted sev-
eral attorneys and social workers, all of whom gave her no reason to
believe that she had a chance of regaining custody of her child. The
court summarized Irma's position when it recognized:
Irma apparently believed that any attempt to communicate [with
her child,] short of obtaining physical custody of [B.S.L.] would be
blocked by [Rick's family]. Accordingly, her efforts were limited to
occasional attempts to obtain custody. Her indigency and her lack
of legal sophistication may have contributed to the appearance of
half-heartedness that characterized these attempts. 77
Use of an objective standard under these circumstances had the effect
of terminating Irma's parental rights for failing to take actions she
believed would be useless. In this instance, the court sent a message
that deceit such as the type employed by Rebecca, while perhaps not
commendable, is equally not condemnable.
Outside the adoption context, an objective inquiry is plausible be-
cause of the interests motivating the respective parties. In a "child in
need of aid" proceeding, the state has no ulterior motive, and it is in
73. Id. at 1228 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (quoting D.A. v. D.R.L., 727 P.2d 768, 770 (Alaska 1986)). See also
S.M.K. v. R.G.G., 702 P.2d 620, 624 (Alaska 1985); D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834,
840 (Alaska 1981).
75. B.S.L., 779 P.2d at 1225.
76. Id. at 1225 n.3.
77. Id. at 1225.
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the state's interest, if at all possible, to salvage the family at issue and
return the child to the natural parents. In adoption proceedings, as
seen in B.S.L., however, the objective inquiry falters. Competing fa-
milial interests increase the likelihood of purposeful deceit by litigants
ordinarily at cross-purposes. The two termination proceedings have
distinct goals: "an adoption proceeding operates to replace a parent,
while a child-in-need-of-aid proceeding operates to emancipate a child
from an offending parent's legal bonds. '78 These distinct goals, and
their effects on the underlying proceedings, justify distinct legal stan-
dards as well.
D. Alternative Standards for Adoption Proceedings
1. Focus Exclusively on the "Best Interests" of the Child. Alaska
considers the question of a child's best interests to be separate from the
question of whether parental consent is necessary.
Alaska is not among those states whose approach to allowing step-
parent adoptions without the noncustodial parent's consent empha-
sizes the best interest of the child. Indeed, this court has repeatedly
ruled that a child's best interests is not relevant to a determination
of whether a noncustodial natural parent's consent is unnecessary. 79
Statutory law describes the proper role for evaluation of a child's best
interests.80 The current rule is that a natural parent's rights may be
terminated in an adoption proceeding if the court determines "(1) pa-
rental consent to adoption is not required; and (2) adoption is in the
best interests of the child. '81
A possible alternative would be to eliminate the first prong of the
inquiry and base adoptions solely on the best interests of the child.
Were Alaska to choose this alternative, it would join, inter alia, Ari-
zona,82 the District of Columbia,8 3 Maryland,84 Massachusetts 5 and
78. Id. at 1226 (emphasis in original).
79. In re J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948, 952 n.12 (Alaska 1986).
80. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (Supp. 1989) ("The relationship of par-
ent and child may be terminated by a court order issued in connection with a proceed-
ing under this chapter... (2) on the grounds that a parent who does not have custody
is unreasonably withholding consent to adoption, contrary to the best interest of the
minor child .. "); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.120(c) (1983) ("If at the conclusion of the
hearing the court determines that the required consents have been obtained or excused
and that the adoption is in the best interest of the person to be adopted, it may issue a
final decree of adoption.").
81. B.S.L., 779 P.2d at 1226 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.23.050, 25.23.120(c)
and 25.23.130(a)).
82. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(c) (1989) ("The court may waive the re-
quirement of consent ... when after a hearing ... the court determines that the
interests of the child will be promoted thereby....").
83. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304(e) (1981) ("The court may grant a petition for
adoption without any.., consents ... when the court finds... that the consent or
consents are withheld contrary to the best interests of the child.").
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Virginia8 6 as "pure" best interest jurisdictions.87 This standard would
be advantageous in that any deceit of the type found in B.S.L. would
not be directly relevant to the final resolution of the proceedings. The
"pure" best interest standard presents a serious disadvantage, how-
ever. Were one party's deceit to go unnoticed for any period of time
(for example, where one parent relocates, leaving the child in the care
of other family members, intending to return for the child at a later
date), the best interests of the child would appear to dictate that the
child not be later returned to the natural parent because of the risk of
long-term damage that could result from the severance of cultivated
psychological bonds. This disadvantage would be especially acute in
situations where the child had been left with family members at a very
young age. Cases such as these would leave courts with the nearly
impossible task of reconciling the best interests of the child with the
constitutionally mandated goal of preserving family integrity.
2. A Subjective Inquiry Combined with Continued Consideration of
the Child's Best Interests. A more workable solution would be to al-
ter, rather than eliminate, the first prong of the adoption inquiry. A
subjective standard should replace the objective, "without justifiable
cause," standard now in use. An example of such a subjective stan-
dard might be that a parent's consent would not be required for the
adoption of his or her child if said parent failed to communicate, de-
spite knowing the whereabouts of the minor child. A subjective stan-
dard would eliminate the possibility of duplicating the result reached
in B.S.L., and would, relatedly, render moot any attempted deceit by
one of the litigants.
By retaining the best interests aspect of the inquiry, moreover,
courts could maintain a degree of objective analysis. Under the best
interests prong of the inquiry, for example, a court could consider
whether it would be in the best interests of a child to be returned to the
84. MD. FAMILY LAW CODE ANN. § 5-312(b)(1) (Supp. 1989) ("Without the
consent of the child's natural parent, a court may grant a decree of adoption to...
[an] individual who has exercised physical care, custody, or control of a child for at
least 6 months, if by clear and convincing evidence the court finds that: (1) it is in the
best interest of the child to terminate the natural parent's rights as to the child .... ).
85. MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 210, § 3(a)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1989) (The consent re-
quirement is eliminated when a petition for adoption is presented if "(ii) the court
hearing the petition finds that the allowance of the petition is in the best interests of
the child .... ").
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(D) (Supp. 1989) ("If... the court finds that the
valid consent of any person or agency whose consent is hereinabove required is with-
held contrary to the best interests of the child.., the court may grant the petition
without such consent. .. ").
87. See generally Comment, A Survey of State Law Authorizing Stepparent Adop-
tions Without the Noncustodial Parent's Consent, 15 AKRON L. REv. 567 (1982).
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custody of a parent whose efforts to communicate were not as exten-
sive as they might have been.
By having both subjective and objective aspects of the adoption
inquiry, the interests of fairness are more ably served. Courts could
continue to focus, as the court did in BS.L., on the conduct of the
non-custodial parent and the steps taken by that parent to overcome
obstacles to custody. At the same time, however, courts could also
consider the reasons for any actions, or lack thereof, by the non-custo-
dial parent. Compared to Alaska's current standard, the proposed
standard better accommodates the interests of both the child and the
parent. As such, the proposed standard better promotes the family
integrity goal which the United States Supreme Court has so forcefully
endorsed.
VI. CONCLUSION
American society views the family as an entity uniquely qualified
to foster in children the values and ideals necessary to their becoming
capable citizens. To ensure that the family is not carelessly or inadver-
tently dissolved, the law has developed certain safeguards. Family in-
tegrity is accorded undisputed deference, and parents are deemed to
have basic rights intended to preserve the family unit.
Unfortunately, parents sometimes disregard the responsibilities
which accompany their basic rights. When such disregard occurs, it is
within the state's power, through parens patriae, to pierce the sanctity
of the family structure and, when no alternatives remain, to sever the
parent-child relationship through termination of the parent's rights.
Currently, both statutory mechanism for terminating parental
rights employ objective standards of proof. The "child in need of aid"
procedure focuses on prior parental conduct in determining a parent's
abandonment of a child, while the adoption proceeding focuses on
whether the parent's failure to communicate with a child lacks "justifi-
able" cause.
The two parental rights termination proceedings produce the
same result. However, the circumstances attendant to a "child in need
of aid" proceeding are vastly different from those attendant to an
adoption proceeding. The litigants in a "child in need of aid" proceed-
ing are the parents and the state. The state's detached status and its
desire to salvage, if possible, the family unit, combined with the par-
ent's control over communication with his or her own child, makes an
objective analysis feasible. In adoption proceedings, on the other
hand, natural parent is often pitted against natural parent for the cus-
tody of their mutual child. The adoption proceeding presents a poten-
tial for abuse of the current standards not evident in the abandonment
context. Thus, a new standard is needed for adoptions to ensure that
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the drastic effect of terminating a parent's rights are not fostered by
deceit and wrongdoing. The best way to ensure fairness in the adop-
tion context would be to undertake a subjective inquiry regarding the
natural parent's communication efforts, counterbalanced by a consid-
eration of the child's best interests as an additional factor. By employ-
ing both subjective and objective inquiries, courts would be better able
to harmonize a child's best interests with the well-established goal of
family preservation.
Sanford Weil Stark

